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UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD?
DR. REPHAEL BEN-ARI*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the century, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction-together
with the newly established International Criminal Court ("ICC")-was supposed to
have become the bedrock of a multilateral endeavor to create a global system of
criminal justice. In the eyes of many, this project was one of the pinnacles of the
post-Cold War era, a milestone achievement of modern international law, denoting
the Kantian vision of a borderless world unified by neo-liberal ideas of humanism
and the rule of law.' However, a few commentators were skeptical. These few
regarded the possibility of national jurisdictions prosecuting foreign perpetrators
for the extraterritorial commission of international crimes to be premature and
unrealistic, politically as well as jurisprudentially.2 Despite the expression of such
skepticism being unpopular at the time, it was nevertheless plainly heard by
several prominent jurists.
Among these skeptics were then-President of the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") Judge Gilbert Guillaume and Law Lord Nicolas Browne-
Wilkinson, who presided over the bench 3 of the House of Lords in the Pinochet
* PhD (Bar-Ilan University); LL.M (Public International Law) (cur Laude) (Leiden University); LL.B
(cur Laude) (Tel Aviv University); 2011-2012 Global Research Fellow & Neil MacCormick Fellow in
Legal Theory, Hauser Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law; Adj.
Professor of Public International Law & International Criminal Law, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of
Law & Netanya Academic College School of Law.
1. See, e.g., ROBERT COOPER, THE BREAKING OF NATIONS: ORDER AND CHAOS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 31 (2003). Cooper regards the ICC as a striking example of the postmodem
breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, reflecting the vision of a world that
is governed by law rather than by force, in which those who break the law will be treated as criminals.
In this postmodem world, raison d'etat is replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to
international relations as well as to domestic affairs. The quest for the establishment of international
judicial institutions therefore, although being established by conventional treaties between sovereign
states, results in "a growing web of institutions that go beyond the traditional norms of international
diplomacy." See also Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political
Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 3-4 (2011).
2. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-
Aug. 2001; Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 311-12, 356-58, 367-74, 427-28 (2004); Chandra Lekha Sriram, New
Mechanisms, Old Problems? Recent Books on Universal Jurisdictions and Mixed Tribunals, 80 INT'L
AFFAIRS 971, 972, 974-75 (2004).
3. See Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
415, 428 (2000).
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case. 4 The latter was the only scholar not to have joined in the adoption of the
2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction -the most significant
academic attempt to date-to propose model principles on universal jurisdiction.
Explaining his reasons for dissenting from the project, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
stated:
I am strongly in favor of universal jurisdiction ... if, by those words, one means
the exercise by an international court or by the courts of one state of jurisdiction
over the nationals of another state with the prior consent of that latter state....
But the Princeton Principles propose that individual national courts should
exercise such jurisdiction against nationals of a state which has not agreed to such
jurisdiction. Moreover the principles do not recognize any form of sovereign
immunity .... If the law were to be so established, states antipathetic to Western
powers would be likely to seize both active and retired officials and military
personnel of such Western powers and stage a show trial for alleged international
crimes. Conversely, zealots in Western States might launch prosecutions against,
for example, Islamic extremists for their terrorist activities. It is natve to think
that, in such cases, the national state of the accused would stand by and watch the
trail proceed: resort to force would be more probable. In any event the fear of such
legal actions would inhibit ... the free interchange of diplomatic personnel. 6
Judge Guillaume, in his Separate Opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, 7 also
noted:
International criminal law has . . . undergone considerable development and
constitutes today an impressive legal corpus. . . . But at no time has it been
envisaged that jurisdiction should be conferred upon the courts of every State in
the world to prosecute such crimes, whoever their authors and victims and
irrespective of the place where the offender is to be found. To do this would,
moreover, risk creating total judicial chaos. It would also be to encourage the
arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful, purportedly acting as agent for an ill-
defined "international community." Contrary to what is advocated by certain
publicists, such a development would present not an advance in the law but a step
backward. 8
These dark prophecies were set aside easily, due to the intellectual
atmosphere that ruled at the time. Nevertheless, a decade later, they have
essentially foretold the course of developments. Interest groups have consistently
manipulated universal jurisdiction, as demonstrated in this paper within the context
4. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex pane Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), (1999) 2
W.L.R. 827 (U.K.).
5. PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001), available at
http://lapa.princeton.edulhosteddocs/univejur.pdf.
6. Id. at 49 n.20.
7. Arrest Warrant of Il April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 35 (Feb. 14).
8. Id. at 35, 1 15 (Separate Opinion of President Guillaume).
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of the ongoing Middle-East conflict and the "war on terror." 9  Consequently,
leading jurisdictions that had initially adopted ambitious versions of universal
jurisdiction-based proceedings were compelled to pass far-reaching modifications
to their laws.
This paper traces the way in which the concept of universal jurisdiction has
been abused since the late 1990s as part of the so-called "lawfare" against Israel.'°
The following section, Part 11, will review briefly the significance of the universal
jurisdiction doctrine, and the main complexities involved in its application within
the framework of the multilateral endeavor to establish an overall system of
international criminal justice. More specifically, Part III will discuss the inherent
potential for manipulation and abuse involved in the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by national courts. Parts IV-VI will review the various universal
jurisdiction-based proceedings initiated against Israeli officials in the legal systems
of Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom respectively, pointing to the dangers
of unrestrained application of the doctrine, as well as the lack of consensus
surrounding its implementation. The last part will demonstrate how the intensive
manipulation of universal jurisdiction has resulted in a counter-reaction that has, in
fact, set back the cause of international global justice, while revealing the risks
involved in the application of a largely unsettled legal doctrine. Altogether, this
has been a historical milestone that will undoubtedly change the way universal
jurisdiction is viewed and dealt with by jurists and politicians alike.
9. See also Luc Reydams, The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction 24-27 (Leuven Ctr. for
Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 37, 2010), available at
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/workingpapers/newseries/wp31-40/wp37.pdf.
10. Originally, "lawfare" was a neutral term, popularized in a 2001 speech at Harvard University
by Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, who defined it as "a strategy of using-or misusing-law as a substitute
for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective." Today, although some argue that
"lawfare" involves the positive use of law and legal institutions to achieve strategic objectives without
the use of military force, the more common use of the term in popular discourse has a distinctly
negative connotation, suggesting abuse, misuse, and exploitation of the law. Thus, the term is used
mostly as a label to criticize those who use international law and legal proceedings against the state,
especially in areas related to national security, to achieve strategic military or political ends. In any
case, it is acknowledged that "lawfare" is "a powerful term that reflects the importance of law in the
conflicts of the twenty-first century," and that the "legitimate application of international law against
participants in an armed conflict should not be labeled "lawfare" (although there is no agreement on a
definition of "legitimate application"). See Is Lawfare Worth Defining? Report of the Cleveland
Experts Meeting Sept. 11, 2010, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 11, 12-13, 18, 20-21 (2010). "The
Lawfare Project"-a New York-based organization devoted to exposing alleged abuses of the
international legal system-cites as examples of"lawfare" the case brought to the ICJ on the legality of
Israel's security barrier; human rights cases sponsored by pro-Palestinian organizations; and litigation
in support of terrorist detainees. See id. at 12 n.3. In recent years "lawfare" has been associated with the
spread of universal jurisdiction, particularly in the case of Israeli officials. See Reydams, supra note 9,
at 26 n.75.
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I!. THE COMPLEX VISION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The last two decades witnessed an unprecedented and rapid development in
the field of international criminal law. I" With the end of the stagnancy and
pessimism that characterized the Cold War era, the path opened for a new "post-
modern" era, underlined by the notions of globalization, de-territorialization, and
interconnectedness, as well as the upholding of the human interest, which
supposedly supersedes national interests. 12 Against this background, the quest for
the establishment of a global system of international justice was enthusiastically
heard within the diplomatic, academic, and civil-society circles.' 3 This intellectual
and political atmosphere facilitated the establishment of several ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, 14 as well as the adoption of the Rome Statute and
the formation of the ICC-a long-awaited major achievement.i This atmosphere
also encouraged renewed interest in the concept of universal jurisdiction, expected
to become a cornerstone of a multilateral endeavor motivated by the vision to
create a comprehensive system to ensure that perpetrators of the "most serious
crimes of international concern"'16 would not find a safe haven, and to deter
potential perpetrators-mostly leaders, high-ranking officials, and commanders-
from materializing their atrocious schemes. 17
Universal jurisdiction is by no means a new concept. Nevertheless, despite
recurring attempts by various forums to outline the doctrine,19 it is still difficult to
11. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 4 (2d. ed. 2008); MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 398,402-03 (6th ed. 2008).
12. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note I, at 50-51, 76 (explaining that in the so-called postmodem
international order, as the state itself becomes less dominating, "state interest becomes less of a
determining factor in foreign policy: the media, popular emotion, the interests of particular groups or
regions (including transnational groups) all come into play." Consequently, the "postmodem state"
values above all the individual, and society as a whole becomes more skeptical of state power, less
nationalistic. For the "postmodem state" success therefore supposedly means openness and
transnational cooperation.). For further discussion of the notions of globalization and de-
territorialization in the context of a postmodem normative discourse, see REPHAEL H. BEN-ARt, THE
NORMATIVE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW-AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 181-221 (2012).
13. See, e.g., Reydams, supra note 9, at 4-6.
14. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY] (establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov.
8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR] (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); as well as
mixed/hybrid tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. See generally SHAW, supra note 11, at 417-18.
15. Considered by some authors to be the most important institutional innovation since the
founding of the United Nations. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT X (4th Ed. 2011).
16. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, art. 1, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183
(July 17, 1998).
17. For a discussion of the objectives of international criminal law, see ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 22-39 (2010).
18. See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 28-42 (2003); Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J.
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find a broadly accepted definition that describes the legal notion of the principle of
universal jurisdiction.20 Clearly, this is one of the main reasons for the substantial
confusion surrounding this usage. The 2009 African Union-European Union
("AU-EU") Joint Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction suggests
that:
[U]niversal criminal jurisdiction is the assertion by one state of its jurisdiction
over crimes allegedly committed in the territory of another state, by nationals of
another state, against nationals of another state, where the crime alleged poses no
direct threat to the vital interests of the state asserting jurisdiction.21
In other words, universal jurisdiction amounts to an exceptional
extraterritorial claim by a state to prosecute crimes in circumstances where none of
the traditional criminal jurisdictional links that rely on a territorial or national
nexus 22 exists at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.23 It is the
heinousness and gravity of the alleged offence-indeed an international crime 24 -
that theoretically justifies the assertion of jurisdiction by national judges,
121, 130 (2007); M ugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights
Abuses in Latin America, China, andBeyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 495,499 (2007).
19. See, e.g., Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Rep. of the Int'l
Law Comm'n, 48th Sess., May 6-July 26, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.522 and Corr.1, at 15-56,
reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.I; INT'L LAW ASS'N
COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRACTICE, FINAL REPORT ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES, REP. OF THE 69TH CONFERENCE
(2000); PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 5; see also INT'L COUNCIL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARD CASES: BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO JUSTICE ABROAD-
A GUIDE TO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (1999), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/5/201 report en.pdf.
20. See Jouet, supra note 18, at 498-99. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Principle of
'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides Assembly's Legal Committee; Further Guidance Sought from
International Law Commission, U.N. Press Release, GA/L/3415 (Oct. 12, 2011) (statement of Mr.
Vieria, Brazil) (calling to "find an acceptable definition of universal jurisdiction").
21. See A U-EU Technical Ad hoc Expert Rep. on the Principles of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 8,
Council of the Eur. Union 8672/1/09 Rev I (Apr. 16 2009), available at http://www.africa-eu-
partnership.org/pdf/rapport-expert ua ue competence universelle en.pdf.
22. That is, the principles of territoriality, nationality, passive personality, or the protective
principle, ordinarily necessary under international law in order to assert jurisdiction by national
authorities.
23. See A U-EU Technical Ad hoc Expert Rep., supra note 21, 1 8.
24. The modem category of "international crimes," unlike "transnational crimes" (such as illicit
trafficking in narcotic drugs, unlawful arms trade, money laundering, etc.), includes breaches of
international rules, intended to protect values considered important by the international community and
consequently binding all states and individuals. The heinousness and gravity of the crimes-or in the
words of the Rome Statute, the recognition that such grave crimes, being "the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole," threaten "the peace, security and well-being of the
world"-underline the universal interest in their repression, and entails the personal criminal liability of
the perpetrators. See CASSESE, supra note 11, at 11-12; SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 89-90; NEIL
BOLSTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3-4, 18-19 (2012); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, supra note 16, at Preamble & arts. 5-8; Draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 19, arts. 1-2, 16-20.
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supposedly acting on behalf of the interests of the "international community as a
whole."
25
Universal jurisdiction is not the only international legal doctrine that enables
states to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals with regard to crimes that have
not been committed on their soil. Numerous international treaties oblige signatory
states to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over crimes defined in those treaties2 6
or to extradite the alleged offender to states that will prosecute them; this
obligation materializes when the suspect is present in the territory of the forum
state. 27  Unlike this form of treaty-based extraterritorial jurisdiction, universal
jurisdiction is regulated by customary international law. States thus largely accept
that customary law permits them to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over
certain categories of international crimes (such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, certain war crimes, piracy, etc.). 29  However, national legislation,
jurisprudence, and practice are far from being conclusive regarding the definition
of categories of international crimes justifying the assertion of universal
jurisdiction. 30  Furthermore, it is unclear whether a state can exercise universal
jurisdiction in absentia, without the accused being in the custody of the forum
state. 3' Another controversial question, which remains open, is the scope of
25. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 16, Preamble; see also
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Preamble, Aug. 8, 1945, U.S.-Fr.-U.K.-U.S.S.R available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtchart.asp ("acting in the interests of all the United Nations").
26. Such treaty crimes include grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the crime of
torture as defined in the Convention against Torture 1984, the crime of enforced disappearance as
defined in the Convention against Enforced Disappearance 2006, as well as certain crimes defined in
the so-called set of anti-terrorism conventions.
27. The so-called principle of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare ("extradite or sentence"), which is
frequently confused with the principle of universal jurisdiction. See also Questions Relating to
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Bel. v. Sen.), 2012 I.C.J. 422, Jill 68, 89-91, 94-95, 99-100 (July
20, 2012); Zdzislaw Galickki, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the Obligation to Extradite or
Prosecute (aut Dedere aut Judicare), Int'l L. Comm'n, 60th Sess., May 5-June 6, July 7-Aug. 8, 2008,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/603, 1I1 24-25, 30, 40, 42, 45-48, 83, 87, 98, 101-02, 105-06, 116, 123-25, 127 (June
10, 2008).
28. There is no duty under customary international law to prosecute all serious human rights
abuses under universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A
Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 895 (2003); Colangelo, supra note 18, at 130.
29. See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 18, at 130.
30. See discussion in Arrest Warrant of II April 2000, supra note 7, at 36 (Separate Opinion of
President Guillaume), 63 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal); see
also Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735,
735-60 (2004).
31. An echo to this controversy can be found in the Joint Separate Opinions of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal, and the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume. Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000, supra note 7, at 35-46, 63-91. See also Jouet, supra note 18, at 498-99 (distinguishing
between countries (such as Austria, France, and Switzerland) that uphold a so-called doctrine of
conditional universal jurisdiction, that requires custody of the accused in order to initiate proceedings
(including investigation), and countries (such as Belgium and Spain, prior to the passage of
amendments to their universal jurisdiction laws) that support the absolute universal jurisdiction
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universal jurisdiction vis-6-vis the immunity recognized for certain high-ranking
officials under international law.
32
III. THE INHERENT PORTENTIAL FOR MANIPULATION AND ABUSE
The ICC and ad hoc criminal tribunals are international institutions that act on
the basis of broad consensus reflected in constituent international treaties and
binding resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. 33  These documents outline a
rather comprehensive scheme of jurisdictional checks and balances. Universal
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is implemented by national authorities. Its
application and interpretation is therefore subjected to the discretion of national
prosecution and judicial authorities as well as the conceptions of politicians
regarding the interests of the international community. 
34
In view of the above, although the modern idea of universal jurisdiction was
often discussed after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials35 and the judgment of the
Israel Supreme Court in the Eichmann case, 36 until two decades ago states were
doctrine, allowing to prosecute a defendant regardless of whether he or she is in custody); see also
O'Keefe, supra note 30, at 747.
32. The ICJ determined, under customary international law, certain holders of high-ranking office
in a state, such as the Head-of-State, Head-of-Government, and Minister of Foreign Affairs (as well as
diplomatic and consular agents) are entitled, while in office, to an absolute (procedural) personal state
immunity from jurisdiction in other states. The Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 7, 51.
The list of high-ranking government officials entitled to such immunity is not exclusive, and depends
on the function of the state official concerned. See also Application for Arrest Warrant against General
Shaul Mofaz, Bow St. Mag. Ct. (unreported), il 10-15 (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/pdf state/Application- for-Arrest-Warrant-Against-Gencral-Shaul-Mofaz.pdf,
Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int'l L. Comm'n., 60th Sess., May 5-June 6, July 7-Aug. 8, 2008, UN
Doe. A/CN.4/601, 111 30-34, 39, 41, 61-63, 66-67, 109, 117-121 (May 29, 2008).
33. See also Sriram, supra note 2, at 311-312. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, supra note 16; ICTY, supra note 14; ICTR, supra note 14.
34. Kontorovich notes that while all nations are in effect joint owners of a right to prosecute under
universal jurisdiction, and may share a common interest in universal jurisdiction offences, they
manifestly differ in the valuations they assign to this interest. Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of
Universal Jurisdiction, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 405 (2008). See also Sriram, supra note 2, at 309
(noting that national judges have taken radically different approaches to the exercise of universal
jurisdiction).
35. See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War
Criminals, Nuremberg, T.S. No. 27 (Sept. 30 - Oct. 1, 1946); Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, (U.S. v. Araki), (12 Nov. 1948).
36. Israel was one of the first states to enact legislation based on the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction for war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people and crimes against humanity. Nazis and
Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, 5710-1950, SH No. 57. The law was the legal basis for the
Eichmann case, decided by the District Court of Jerusalem and the Supreme Court of Israel in 1961/2.
CrimC (Jer.) 40/61 Attorney General v. Eichmann, (1961); CA 336/61 Eichmann v. Attorney General
[1962]. As such, the case is considered the starting point in so far as universal jurisdiction as
manifested in domestic courts is concerned. See SHAW, supra note 11, at 671. Although, as the judges
in the Eichmann case made clear, due to the unique circumstances, the jurisdiction of Israel was also
based on the principle of passive personality, due to the fact that the victims were Jewish and were
therefore represented by the State of Israel, which was the Jewish state. CA 336/61 Eichmann v.
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reluctant to implement it. The high political costs and the risks of infringing upon
the sovereignty of other states deterred national authorities from legislating and
applying this vague customary doctrine. 37 Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, several
countries-mostly Western-European, led by Belgium and Spain, which were
probably motivated by the adoption of the Rome Statute and heated discussions
about the future of the international rule of law in view of dreadful events such as
in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Congo-began to adopt laws enabling their courts to hear
claims based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. 38 Such claims, submitted
by foreign individuals, mostly victims of atrocities, and various international non-
governmental organizations ("INGOs"), on the basis of national legislation that
broadly interpreted the principle of universal jurisdiction, brought about a massive
number of claims that practically turned certain European capitals into self-
appointed international criminal courts. 3 9  Eventually, only very few of these
claims matured into convictions. 40 However, this has not prevented numerous
claimants and interested parties to issue complaints against top foreign officials
and political leaders, having discovered the possibility of abusing universal
jurisdiction-based proceedings as a powerful tool for the promotion of political
agendas.
The record of pro-Palestinian groups in this regard has been highly
significant. The intensive manipulation of universal jurisdiction in the past few
years, within the framework of their so-called "lawfare" campaign against Israel, 41
takes much credit for the fact that within less than a decade, most of the leading
countries that recognized an unqualified national version of universal criminal
jurisdiction had to modify their legislation to limit the ability of foreign interest
groups and individuals to initiate proceedings that abused their courts.42
The potential for abuse and politicization of the universality principle is
signifiant. It was mainly for this reason that universal jurisdiction was sharply
described by one commentator as a "waking giant" that might brutally threaten to
smash the already fragile web of interstate relations.43 As interest groups soon
discovered, the costs of initiating a claim were relatively low, while the potential
Attorney General [1962], 1116, 9-12. See also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 7, at 40-43 11
12 (considering Israel's legislation and jurisprudence to constitute "a very special case").
37. See Byers, supra note 3, at 420-21.
38. See Jouet, supra note 18, at 501; Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal
Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO L.J. 1057, 1059-60 (2004).
39. In fact, the jurisdiction of the ICC is considerably narrower than that which was claimed by
some states under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at xi-xii, 63-67;
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 16, art. 12.
40. See Reydams, supra note 9, at 22; Michele Hirsch & Natalie Kumps, The Belgian Law of
Universal Jurisdiction Put to the Test, 35 JUSTICE 21 (2003).
41. See, e.g., Edwin Bennatan, The Use and Abuse of Universal Jurisdiction, Point/Counterpoint
blog, JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 28, 2010 5:53 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/Point-Counterpoint/The-
use-and-abuse-of-Universal-Jurisdiction-368079.
42. See infra Parts IV-VI.
43. See Yaffa Zilbershats, Universal Jurisdiction: The Waking Giant, 35 JUSTICE 15 (2003).
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for political and media gains were enormous. 44 Since universal jurisdiction-based
proceedings were the exclusive domain of national, rather than international,
judicial authorities, in most cases it was sufficient for interest groups or individuals
to find a low-level, like-minded judge who was willing to begin an investigation
into a case, or worse, to issue an arrest warrant against some senior foreign
official.45 Regardless of the fact that in most cases such a warrant was revoked and
the complaint was withdrawn, 46 the harassment caused to the official, the headlines
that such an investigation produced, and the political embarrassment that followed
had an immediate impact on international public opinion. It also impacted the
bilateral relations between the forum state and that of the suspected official. If the
latter retaliated, the two governments could very soon find themselves in the eye of
an international political storm that could easily get out of hand. For these reasons,
bringing suspected perpetrators of international crimes to justice has turned, at
best, into a secondary goal; the golden opportunity to interfere in the normal course
of interstate relations has become a prominent incentive to filing complaints
against foreign officials in third states.
In the following sections, I will review the proceedings initiated against
Israeli officials in Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom from 2001 to 2010.
Lawsuits against Israeli officials were also initiated in other countries.47 However,
44. See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, Special Dossier on the "Sabra and Shatila" Case in Belgium:
Introduction: New Lights on the Sharon Case, in THE PALESTINE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
VOL. XII (2002-2003) 183, 183 (Camille Mansour, ed., 2004) (admitting that he, as the counsel for the
Sabra and Shatila victims in the Sharon and Yaron case in Belgium, could not imagine that the case
"would develop into the most serious crisis between Tel-Aviv and a European capital since the
establishment of the State of Israel; and that both the U.S. Secretary of State and his defense counterpart
would weigh in personality against the law on which the case was based.").
45. See, e.g., Bennatan, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Recent Legislation. International Law - Universal Jurisdiction - United Kingdom
Adds Barrier to Private Prosecution of Universal Jurisdiction Crimes-Police Reform and Social
Responsibility Act, 2011, c. 13 (U.K.), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1554 (regarding the arrest warrants issued in
the cases of Maj. Gen. Doron Almog (Sep. 2005), and former Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni
(Dec. 2009) in the U.K.). See also Reydams, supra note 9, at 22 (distinguishing the features of the few
so-called universal jurisdiction "hard cases" that did result in trial and conviction). Nicolaou-Garcia
also acknowledges that since politics plays a pivotal role in high-profile universal jurisdiction cases,
judicial investigations are normally halted and parliaments change their universal jurisdiction law. See
SILVIA NICOLAou GARCIA, MIDDLE EAST MONITOR (MEMO, LONDON), EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO
APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AGAINST ISRAELI OFFICIALS, (2009), available at
http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/reports/by-silvia-nicolaou-garcia/. Prosor notes that "campaigners
targeting Israeli officials know they have no chance of getting a prosecution, let alone a conviction.
Instead they are seeking a media circus and PR victory." Ron Prosor, A Loophole that Must Be
Repaired, JUSTICE, Winter 2011, at 36.
47. In Switzerland (against Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, former Minister of Defense, and others); in
New Zealand, 2005 (against Moshe Ya'alon, former Chief-of-Staff of the IDF); in the United States,
2005 (against Moshe Ya'alon); in the United States, 2005 (against Avi Dichter, former Director of the
General Security Service); in Holland, 2008 (against Ami Ayalon, former Director of the General
Security Service); in Norway, 2009 (against Ehud Olmert, former Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, former
Minister of Defense, Tzipi Livni, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others); in Turkey, 2009
(against Shimon Peres, former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni, Ehud
Barak, and Gabi Ashkenazi, former Chief-of-Staff). The list is not conclusive. JERUSALEM CENTER
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abuse of universal jurisdiction proceedings in these particular states was the most
far-reaching and thus exemplify the high costs involved in "universal jurisdiction
campaigns."
IV. THE PROCEEDINGS IN BELGIUM
The pilot case brought by pro-Palestinian plaintiffs under national universal
jurisdiction legislation was the Sharon Case. 48 Although this case did not result in
a conviction, the public, political, and legal turmoil it caused, which lasted for
several years, motivated pro-Palestinian groups to initiate many additional
proceedings in various countries in Europe.49
In June 2001, twenty-four individuals of Palestinian or Lebanese origin filed a
complaint in Belgium against the then Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, and
the Director-General of the Ministry of Defense, Amos Yaron, for genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes. 50 The two top government officials were
accused of being responsible for the Sabra and Shatila massacres in 1982.51
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PALESTINIAN MANIPULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 40 n.30 (Alan
Baker ed., 2014), available at http://jcpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/PalestinianManipulation.pdf. See also Overview of Lawfare Cases Involving
Israel, NGO MONITOR (last visited Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://www.ngo-
monitor.org/article/ngolawfare.
48. H.S.A et al. v. S.A. et al., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Feb. 12, 2003, No.
P.02.1139. F/I (BeIg.), 42 1.L.M. 596 (2003).
49. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 183. The unique and complex set of circumstances in the Sharon
and Yaron affair-the fact that Sharon was an acting Prime Minister entailed to procedural immunity
under international law; that Sharon and Yaron were not present in Belgium; that the Sabra and Shatila
massacres were already investigated in Israel by a special investigation commission (the Kahan
Commission) that was authorized to recommend disciplinary or criminal proceedings; and that the
Lebanese authorities had granted a general amnesty to the perpetrators of the massacres-probably
made potential claimants believe that under a different, less complicated and contentious set of
circumstances, an action against Israeli officials could be successful. See, e.g., Arwa Arburawa, WAR
CRIMES IN GAZA 9, 49-51 (Rajnaara Akhtar, ed., Sept., 2009), available at
http://issuu.com/friendsofalaqsa/docs/gazareport-web?viewMode=magazine.
50. The complaint was the initiative of Chibli Mallat, Professor in European Law in St. Joseph's
University in Beirut, together with two Belgian lawyers, Michael Verhaeghe and Luc Walleyn. It was
the outcome of months of intensive research in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon aimed at
identifying the immediate relatives of victims of the massacres, held by Sana Hussein and Dr.
Rosemary Sayegh, "friend of the Palestinian cause," dealing with Palestinians in Lebanon. See Mallat,
supra note 44, at 183, 185. The criminal procedure under the Belgian law was based on the system of
constitution de parlie civile ("plaintiff-prosecutors" system), by which the victims initiate cases before
an investigating judge. See Ratner, supra note 28, at 890.
51. The massacres of 700-800 Palestinians occurred in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps
between 16-18 Sep. 1982, during the Lebanon War, by Christian Phalanges in revenge for previous
massacres and the assassination of their leader Bashir Jumayil. Following the massacres, the Israeli
government appointed an inquiry commission chaired by Justice Kahan to investigate the events and
Israel's role in them. The commission did not find any of the relevant Israeli office holders directly
responsible, although it criticized several of them for not being sufficiently aware of the possible
implications of the Phalanges' advance into the camps; Sharon was required to resign from his post.
For a historical account of the events in Lebanon, see Yoav Gelber, The Lawsuit Submitted against
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Clearly, the claimants were encouraged by the November 1998 and March
1999 landmark rulings of the House of Lords in ex parte Pinochet 2 that allowed,
for the first time, the extradition of a former head of state, the Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet, from Britain to Spain, following a request made by a Spanish
investigating judge on the basis of the Spanish universal jurisdiction law.53 The
very supportive public and academic atmosphere that surrounded the Pinochet
proceedings gave the impression that legal history was being made and that victims
would finally find redress under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. 54 It gave the
claimants reason to believe that similar proceedings in other countries against
acting top officials could be highly successful and attract extensive public
attention. Belgium was a strong possibility as a venue for such claims: it was one
of the countries which, in addition to Spain, had an arrest warrant outstanding
against Pinochet, and it was the only government that joined human rights
organizations in challenging the decision by the U.K. Home Secretary not to
release the report that led to Pinochet's eventual release on medical grounds.
55
A. Malicious Forum Shopping
The claimants chose the Belgian forum after careful examination of the
various options within a number of western systems. 56 The 1993 Belgian law (as
amended in 1999) established the universal jurisdiction of the Belgian courts,
which related to the prosecution of gross violations of international humanitarian
law, genocide, and crimes against humanity.5 7 The law had already been applied
once, which in June 2001-just a few days before the complaint against Sharon
and Yaron was filed 58-led to the conviction of four Rwandan defendants who
resided in Belgium and were found guilty of participating in the 1994 Rwandan
Ariel Sharon in Belgium: Historical Background, 35 JUSTICE 25-28 (2003), available at
http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/main/files/Justice%2ONo.35%20Spring%202003.pdf . Sharon was
the Israeli Defense Minister in 1982, and Yaron was the general in charge of the Beirut sector. For a
detailed chronology of the proceedings in Belgium, see Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 20-24. See
also Ratner, supra note 28 at 889-92.
52. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1), (1999) 2
W.L.R. 827 (U.K.); Regina v. Bow St. Metro. (No. 3), at 147. Eventually, despite an executive decision
(October 1999) to allow the extradition of Pinochet to Spain, he was found unfit medically to stand trial.
The extradition was called off and Pinochet was released and sent back to Chile. See Byers, supra note
3, at 437-38.
53. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 183.
54. See Jouet, supra note 18, at 502; id. at 187, 189; see generally Byers, supra note 3, at 418-22.
55. See Byers, supra note 3, at 438; Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 21. Belgium's challenge
was successful and the medical report was released.
56. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 186. Recall that although the majority in Pinochet IH upheld the
decision in Pinochet I to deny former Head-of-State immunity, the ruling was not based on customary
international law, but relied primarily on the Torture Convention and the Criminal Justice Act 1988,
thus limiting the denial of immunity to those instances where universal jurisdiction had specifically
been accepted by way of treaty and statute. See Byers, supra note 3, at 434. Therefore, despite the
Pinochet precedent in the United Kingdom, it was preferable to go to Belgium.
57. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 20. See generally Langer, supra note 1, at 26-32.
58. The filing of the complaint on behalf of the Sabra and Shatila victims immediately after the
conviction in the "Rwandan trial" was carefully calculated. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 184.
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genocide. 59 The "Rwandan trial" led to a stream of complaints filed in Belgium 60
against high-ranking foreign government officials. 61 Some of these complaints,
however, did not have any link whatsoever to Belgium. 62  Eventually, this led
some Belgian politicians and jurists to call for amendments to the law that would
limit its unqualified application. 63 The Palestinian complaint filed in the midst of
this domestic debate regarding the Belgian law politicized the dispute by
provoking NGOs and politicians-who were lobbied intensively-to take a
harsher public stance in favor of an extension of Belgian jurisdiction. 64
The political nature of the complaint in the Sharon case was obvious: none of
the complainants resided in Belgium.65 More significantly, the complaint failed to
mention any of the Lebanese citizens who were directly responsible for the
66 6massacres. The complaint highlighted the crime of genocide,67 giving the
impression that the defendants were involved in a comprehensive genocidal
scheme and bearing the potential for further allegations against other officials
involved in the Lebanon War. The claimants strategically timed the filing of the
complaint, tailoring it to fit the delicate political circumstances: it was three
months after Prime Minister Sharon was elected (March 2001) and right before
Belgium was to assume the Presidency of the European Union (July-December
2001).
B. A Universal Jurisdiction Campaign
The filing of the complaint was accompanied by a well-orchestrated press
campaign. On the eve of filing the complaint, BBC aired its Panorama program
The Accused, investigating the role of Sharon in the Sabra and Shatila massacres,
of which counsels for the victims had been informed two weeks in advance
59. On the significance of the "Rwandan trial" and its possible consequences as a leading
universal jurisdiction precedent see Ratner, supra note 28, at 892; Jouet, supra note 18, at 528-29.
60. Which turned Belgium into the uncrowned "world capital of universal jurisdiction." See
Jouet, supra note 18, 501 (quoting Orentlicher, supra note 38).
61. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 21; Langer, supra note 1, at 30.
62. In the beginning, either the suspect or the victims were living in Belgium. In a later stage,
complaints did not even possess such links. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 21.
63. Although Belgium's law was not the world's first domestic statute on universal jurisdiction, it
was certainly the broadest in terms of the crimes it covered and the lack of any required link to
Belgium. See Ratner, supra note 28, at 889. Evidently, the original law was passed without taking into
account the various serious issues entailed by the enactment of such law and its application. See Hirsch,
supra note 40, at 21. See generally Adrien Masset, The Supreme Court of Belgium Puts an End to the
Prosecution of Sharon, 35 JUSTICE 29-30 (2003), available at
http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/main/files/Justice%2ONo.35%20Spring%202003.pdf.
64. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 21, 23. A group of six NGOs was established to
participate in the drafting process, in an effort to ensure the adoption of an interpretative legislation that
extended the scope of the universal jurisdiction law.
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through an Amnesty International friend.68 Counsel for the claimants distributed
the lengthy text of the complaint at a press conference held immediately after it
had been formally filed; the text was later posted on the Internet and translated into
six languages. 69 A special website dedicated exclusively to the case launched the
"International Campaign for the Victims of Sabra and Shatila,"7° while supportive
"Sabra and Shatila committees" sprang up across the world. 7 All of this attracted
massive media attention as well as the active involvement of academics and
human-rights activists.72 Massive financial support and the backing of leading
INGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Avocats Sans
Fronti~res, were assured in advance, 73 coloring the proceedings as a battle, pitting
Israel against universal jurisdiction and the global "fight against impunity."
74
Belgian politicians were also motivated to get involved in the proceedings. A
group of Belgian senators intervened several times before the Prosecution
Chamber.7 5  A delegation of senators, headed by J. Dubi6, Head of the Justice
Commission at the Belgian Senate, along with leading journalists, even flew to
Lebanon to meet with Elias Hobeika, the leader of the Phalangist forces who had
been accused of directing the massacre in the camps. 76 A meeting with victims of
the massacres, who were flown to Belgium, was organized at the Belgian Senate
following a hearing before the Prosecution Chamber. 77  During the hearing,
invitations to journalists to attend a press conference at the Senate were
distributed.78
C. Legal Turmoil and Political Embarrassment
From the moment that the Belgian prosecution invited the investigating
magistrate to begin the examining procedure and the State of Israel got involved in
the proceedings, challenging the legality of the unqualified Belgian law under
68. Mallat, supra note 44, at 185-86. See also The Accused (BBC Television broadcast Jun. 17,
2001), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/1381328.stm.
69. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 185.
70. The International Campaign was coordinated by the leading pro-Palestinian activist, Dr.
Laurie King-Irani, who later co-founded the 'Electronic Intifada.' See Laurie King-Irani, UNIV.
COLLEGE CORK PALESTINE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN,
http://cosmos.ucc.ie/csl064/jabowen/IPSC/php/authors.php?auid=842 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014); see
also Mallat, supra note 44, at 184.
71. Mallat, supra note 44, at 184.
72. Mallat acknowledges in particular the active support of Yale Law School Human Rights
Clinic, under the direction of Deena Hurwitz and Jim Silk, as well as of Leah Tsemel and Raef
Verstraeten. Id.
73. See id.; see also Hirsch & Kumps,supra note 40, at 22.
74. Mallat, supra note 44, at 186.
75. Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 23.
76. See id.; see also Mallat, supra note 44, at 186-88. Hobeika, former Lebanese MP, was
assassinated the morning after his meeting with the Belgian delegation, near his home in a Beirut
suburb. Clearly, Hobeika, who was encouraged by the counsels for the victims to take part in the
proceedings, saw a golden opportunity to clear his name as the perpetrator of the massacres. Id. at 186.
77. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 23.
78. Id.
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international law, 79 the "Sharon affair" evolved rapidly, encompassing many twists
and turns. The critical issues about whether the presence of the accused was a
precondition for the application of universal jurisdiction by national judges-and
whether an incumbent Prime Minister was entitled to procedural immunity under
international law °-were reviewed by the full chain of Belgian courts as well as
the most senior prosecution officials, reaching the Supreme Court in 2003
following an appeal by the plaintiffs. 8' Much of the sting of the case was removed
once the ICJ ruled in the Arrest Warrant case 82 in 2002 that a Prime Minister,
while in office, was entitled to procedural-personal (ratione personae) immunity
from any criminal proceedings under customary international law.8 3  Later,
although the Appeals Court ruled that the presence of the accused in Belgium was
required in order to allow the proceedings, the Cour de Cassation overruled the
decision, allowing the proceedings against Amos Yaron to proceed, rejecting the
position of Israel, and upholding the position that the application of the Belgian
universal jurisdiction law was indeed unlimited.8 4 In light of this development,
and after intensive legal and diplomatic efforts, Israel recalled its ambassador from
Brussels.85
It was not until a complaint was filed against former President of the United
States George H.W. Bush and other high-ranking American officials by several
Iraqi families preceding the second war against Iraq,86 and the American
administration threatened to take far-reaching political steps in response-
including the closure of the NATO headquarters in Brussels-that the Belgian
authorities were finally "convinced" to introduce significant amendments to their
law on universal jurisdiction, limiting its scope and proceedings.8 7 The amended
79. See id. at 22; see also Masset, supra note 63, at 29-30.
80. Another question was the application of the non bis in idem principle, regarding the absence of
criminal proceedings in Israel following the publication of the Kahan Commission report and the
amnesty granted by the Lebanese authorities to the perpetrators of the massacres in Sabra and Shatila.
Masset, supra note 63, at 35.
81. A full review of the legal proceedings in Belgium, and the arguments of the State of Israel, is
beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 22-24; see also
Masset, supra note 63, at 29-30.
82. In 2000, the Democratic Republic of Congo contested before the ICJ the legality of an arrest
warrant issued by a Belgian judge against Yerodia Ndombasi, the Foreign Minister at the time of the
warrant. In 2002 the ICJ found the warrant to be inconsistent with the procedural immunity to which an
acting minister of foreign affairs is entitled under customary international law. Case Concerning the
Arrest Warrant, supra note 7.
83. See supra note 32.
84. Ratner, supra note 28, at 890.
85. The culmination of what was described by the counsel for the Sabra and Shatila victims as
"the most serious crisis between Tel-Aviv and a European capital since the establishment of the state of
Israel." Mallat, supra note 44, at 183; see also Ratner, supra note 28, at 890.
86. Vice President D. Cheney, Secretary of State C. Powell, and former general N. Schwartzkopf.
87. Orentlicher, supra note 38, at 1062. In view of the American wamings that Belgium was
risking its status as a diplomatic capital, G. Verhofstadt-the Belgian Prime Minister leading a pro-
human-rights coalition of Liberals, Socialists, and Greens-who during the Sharon trial expressed
support for the unqualified application of the law, immediately proposed the amendments to limit its
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law essentially required a link between the victim or the accused to Belgium and
invested the Federal Prosecutor with wide authority to oversee the proceedings,
thus effectively barring foreign individuals and interest groups from filing abusive
complaints. 88 Israel's main argument before the Belgian courts-that the initial
unqualified version of the law was designed to grant Belgium "virtual and
surrealistic jurisdiction over all offences against international humanitarian law in
the world,"8 9 thus diverting from the scope of universal jurisdiction under
customary law and allowing manifestly political claims to proceed-was finally
resolved.
Thus, the "Sharon saga" showed the international community that:
Universal jurisdiction does not operate in a vacuum. The process. . . raises
interstate tensions in ways that even the most vociferous criticism by one state of
another's human rights practices does not... [W]hen justice becomes personal, so
does foreign policy. And when private prosecutors are part of the mix, the match
can get very ugly.
90
Unfortunately, although the Sharon case could serve as a laboratory for the
future of universal jurisdiction by highlighting the myriad of international actors
who had a direct interest in these laws and the steps they would take to advance
their claims,91 some states had yet to learn the lesson.
V. THE PROCEEDINGS IN SPAIN
The Belgian experience, while failing to reach the stage of a court trial,
proved to be very fruitful in terms of its political and propaganda impact. Once the
Belgian door closed, it was, therefore, a matter of time before more plaintiffs
initiated proceedings in countries that still allowed their legislation to be
manipulated by foreign complainants. Indeed, as a report issued by the U.K. -based
Friends ofAl-Aqsa revealed, filing lawsuits against Israeli officials was a very high
priority for Palestinian activists:
The momentum is growing and resistance is mounting. Each of us who
participates in the Palestinian cause is part of that resistance. Thus far, thousands
of us have risen up and taken action. We are working to file arrest warrants for
war crimes and crimes against humanity against Israeli military personnel in every
jurisdiction around the world that allows it.92
application in order to prevent "manifestly abusive political use of this law." Ratner, supra note 28, at
890-91; Langer, supra note 1, at 26.
88. The law also acknowledged the immunities of senior officials recognized under customary
law; for a review and analysis of the amendments to the Belgian law, see Ratner, supra note 28, at 890-
92. See also Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 24.
89. Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 24.
90. Ratner, supra note 28, at 893-94.
91. Id. at 889. See also Jouet, supra note 18, at 528.
92. Ismail Patel, Forward, in WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49, at 9.
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Spain, the leading country at the time in terms of promoting the notion of an
unlimited universal jurisdiction,9 3 was an obvious option. 94
A. The Tyranny of Interested Judges and Activists' Groups
Although the Spanish law on universal jurisdiction, first enacted in 1985, was
not as broad as the initial Belgian law,95 courts still interpreted it as allowing
investigations against foreign defendants to be held in absentia96 without any link
to Spain.97 This gave the investigating judges of the Audiencia Nacional
("National Audience")98 expansive jurisdictional power to hear complaints brought
by various human rights organizations and private litigants against foreign officials
and to open criminal investigations accordingly. Such was the case with the
Pinochet affair, which brought world fame to the Spanish investigating judge.
Baltasar Garz6n, who in 1998 demanded the extradition from Britain of the former
dictator, within his investigations into the mass atrocities that took place in Chile.
99
Clearly, Garz6n set an example for other judges of the Audiencia, who were
encouraged by various INGOs and human rights purists to continue their "crusade
to vindicate gross human rights violations" in Spanish courts. °00 Nevertheless,
much like the case in Belgium, and despite the success of the Pinochet case, the
zealous atmosphere and the fact that several states whose citizens were being
prosecuted protested vehemently against the violation of their sovereignty,'
10
provoked a public debate in Spain. Pragmatists warned against the adoption of a
"radical form of universal jurisdiction devoid of strong procedural footing that
could violate international customary law and harm diplomatic relations."102 This
debate was followed by a clash between Spain's two high courts-the Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Tribunal-over the correct interpretation of the
Spanish law regarding universal jurisdiction. 103 In 2005, the Constitutional Court
93. Jouet, supra note 18, at 501.
94. As was predicted by some commentators. See id. at 531.
95. See id. at 499, 512, 522. See generally Langer, supra note 1, at 32-41.
96. Jouet, supra note 18, at 512 (The Belgian law originally allowed trials in absentia, not only
investigations).
97. Id. at 497, 510.
98. Id. at 504 (This is the Spanish trial court responsible for matters of international and national
interest, including international crimes and terrorism).
99. The same set of investigations, dealing with the junta reign in Argentina, led in 2004 to the
arrest in Spain of Adolfo Schilingo, an Argentine navy officer charged with mass-murdering during
Argentina's Dirty War. This was one of the very few and probably the most famous case brought under
a universal jurisdiction law that ended in a conviction after passing a complete series of appeals. See
generally id. at 502, 505
100. Id. at 501; Soeren Kern, Spain, Israel and War Crimes, GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Apr. 8, 2009,
6:30 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/455/spain-isreal-and-war-crimes.
101. Jouet, supra note 18, at 502-03.
102. Id. at 503.
103. See id. at 505-07 (The Supreme Court in 2004 interpreted the law as requiring a link to
national interests, clarifying that the Spanish courts could only exert a narrow form of universal
jurisdiction. The court explained that a broader form of universal jurisdiction would be unreasonable
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eventually overruled the decision of the Supreme Court, thus upholding the
unqualified version of the Spanish law. 10 4 This effectively provided the judges of
the Audiencia a carte blanche to initiate unrestrained investigations in absentia,
without having to wait for an alleged culprit to enter Spain's territory. 105
As in Belgium, the pro-Palestinian lawyers took advantage of the loud,
ongoing public debate over the scope of universal jurisdiction in Spain to bring in a
controversial complaint against former Israeli officials. In June 2008, the
Palestinian Center for Human Rights ("PCHR") 10 6 filed a complaint before
Audiencia Judge Fernando Andreu Merelles against seven high-ranking officials
for suspected "crimes against humanity" for their involvement in the July 2002
targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh, the commander of the military wing of Hamas
in Gaza. 0 7 The PCHR, acting on behalf of some of the families of civilian
casualties, hoped that "universal jurisdiction would become a real avenue for
Palestinians to seek redress for Israeli crimes" following this case. 108 To this end,
the PCHR hired the services of the Spanish lawyer Gonzalo Boy-a Marxist
and would violate the principle of non-intervention in another state's affairs as enshrined in Art. 2(7) of
the U.N. Charter).
104. Id. at 508.
105. The Constitutional Tribunal essentially held that a procedural link to national interests was not
required since universal jurisdiction was exclusively based on the substantive nature of grave crimes
affecting the entire international community. See id. at 508-10, 512.
106. The PCHR was founded in 1995 by a group of Palestinian human rights lawyers. It mainly
operates from Gaza. According to the center's definition, its work includes the documentation and
investigation of human rights violations. The center was behind most of the lawsuits against senior
Israeli officials abroad: Shaul Mofaz (U.K., 2002); Doron Almog (U.K., 2005); Avi Dichter (U.S.,
2005); Moshe Ya'alon (New Zealand, 2006); Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and others (Spain, 2008); Ami
Ayalon (Holland, 2008). According to the center's 2008 report, and the reports of the organizations that
support it, the main donors to the PCHR are: the Welfare Association (financed by the World Bank,
among others); the NGO Development Center (financed by the World Bank, among others); the Open
Society Institute (U.S.); Grassroots International (U.S.); the Ford Foundation (U.S.); as well as the
E.U. and several European governments. See KELA RESEARCH & STRATEGY, THE FINANCING OF
WELFARE ASSOCIATION (WA) AND NGO DEVELOPMENT CENTER (NDC) BY THE US GOVERNMENT VIA
THE WORLD BANK 18-19 (on file with the author); see also THE MEIR AMIT INTELLIGENCE AND
TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER, THE PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PLAYS A LEADING
ROLE IN ANTI-ISRAELI WARFARE AND Is PLANNING TO EXPLOIT OPERATION PILLAR OF DEFENSE TO
SUE SENIOR ISRAELI FIGURES 6-8 (2013); Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), NGO
MONITOR, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/palestiniancenter for human rightspchr (last visited
July 2, 2012).
107. See WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49 at 50. For a brief history of the proceedings in
Israel, see Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Universal Jurisdiction: Spanish Court Initiates an Inquiry
of the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh in Gaza, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY NEWSLETTER, no. 3,
Mar. 2009 (Salah Shehadeh was a member of the Hamas. He masterminded numerous terror attacks
against Israeli civilians and soldiers in the Gaza strip and within Israel; he was involved in the
production of Qassam rockets fired against Israeli civilian targets, and in the smuggling of arms into the
Gaza strip. As the leader of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades military wing of the Hamas in Gaza, he
was responsible for suicide attacks that caused the death of hundreds of Israeli civilians. On July 22,
2002, Israel executed a targeted killing operation directed at Shehadeh. An IDF aircraft dropped a one-
ton bomb on Shehadeh's house, killing him and 14 other people, and injuring many civilians. The
attack was widely criticized by governments and human rights organizations, including in Israel.).
108. See WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49 at 50.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
revolutionary who had served a ten-year sentence in Spanish prison for
collaborating with the Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ("ETA") and
was involved in most of the universal jurisdiction lawsuits filed in Spain, including
those against U.S. officials.'0 9 By the end of January 2009, following Boy6's
petition, the Spanish magistrate, Andreu, who identified an opportunity to follow
his colleague Garz6n"n0 and to gain international publicity, issued a decision to
open a criminal investigation against Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, former Minister of
Defense; Dan Halutz, former Commander of the Israeli Air-Force; Moshe Ya'alon,
former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Force ("IDF"); Avraham Dichter,
former Director of the General Security Service; Doron Almog, former General of
the Southern Command of the IDF; Giora Eiland, former Chairman of the National
Security Council and National Security Advisor; and Michael Hertzog, former
Military Secretary of the Israel Minister of Defense."' Andreu determined that
"the events may and must [emphasis added] be investigated by the Spanish courts"
as the evidence suggested that Israel had engaged in a "disproportionate attack,"
based on the Spanish law of universal jurisdiction as interpreted by the
Constitutional Tribunal to provide absolute jurisdiction. '1 2
B. A War on the "War on Terror"
As in Belgium, the complainants carefully calculated the timing of the filing
of this particular lawsuit, leaving no doubt as to its political nature: Operation Cast
Lead, the IDF ground invasion of the Gaza Strip (December 2008-January 2009),
ended a few days before Judge Andreu released his decision to open an
investigation into the case.'' 3 World attention was focused on the Gaza Strip.
1 14
Israel was desperately "trying to fend off foreign censure over the civilian death
toll" during that operation." 15 The U.N. Human Rights Council called for an
international fact-finding mission to investigate the conduct of Israel,"16 while a
network of European lawyers and pro-Palestinian activists prepared a list with the
names and personal data of some two hundred Israeli soldiers, which was made
109. See Gregory Gordon, Spanish UJ - From Pinochet to Purgatory?, OPINIO JURIS (Jul. 24,
2009, 1:26 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/07/24/spanish-uj-from-pinochet-to-purgatory/; see also
Kern, supra note 100.
110. See Kern, supra note 100.
I 11. See Rosenzweig & Shany, supra note 107.
112. Id.
113. Preliminary Proceedings 157/2008, Central Magistrates' Court Number Four of the High
Court in Madrid (Jan. 29, 2009); Kern, supra note 100.
114. PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (PCHR), THE PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: PCHR'S WORK IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 7 (2010).
115. Kern, supra note 100.
116. Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories:
Report of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 1 1975, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48, (Sept.
25, 2009) [hereinafter Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict] (The
Report of the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (the so-called "Goldstone Report")
indeed recommended states parties to the Geneva Conventions to "start criminal investigations in
national courts, using universal jurisdiction." (italics added)).
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available on a special website called Israeli war criminals.117 A complaint dealing
with an alleged war crime amounting to a "crime against humanity" that would
lead to a foreign criminal investigation into the conduct of the IDF in the Gaza
Strip in the past was a perfect legal ambush; it could set a significant precedent and
focus maximum international attention that would put Israel under heavy public
and diplomatic pressure at home and abroad.1 8 Furthermore, unlike the complaint
against Sharon and Yaron in Belgium, the specific context of the current complaint
was meant to showcase the role of international criminal law in reviewing the
legality of counter-terrorism measures employed by states involved in the "War on
Terror" led by the United States and Israel. 1 9 The application of universal
jurisdiction as a "weapon" to review counter-terrorism strategies 12 was meant to
attract the sympathy and support of human-rights activists and INGOs as part of an
"anti-western globalism [movement that used] international law to eat away at
national sovereignty."' 121 In this respect, an unfolding investigation would send a
clear message that a state's response to terrorist attacks represented "a more
serious violation of international law than the original act of terrorism." 122
C. Delegitimizing Domestic Proceedings
Most importantly, plaintiffs filed the complaint in Spain while proceedings in
Israel regarding the Shehadeh affair were still pending. The Israeli High Court of
Justice ("HCJ"), which had determined that targeted killing operations were not
forbidden as such, 123 nevertheless had recommended the establishment of a special,
independent examination committee with a mandate to examine the collateral
damage caused by the killing of Shehadeh and its possible implications. 24 The
committee, which was authorized to recommend disciplinary or criminal
proceedings, had yet to conclude its investigation when the complaint in Spain was
filed.125 In fact, just a few days before the submission of the lawsuit by the PCHR
117. Anshel Pfeffer, Lawyers in EU draw up list of alleged IDF war criminals, HAARETZ (Oct. 27,
2009, 1:36 AM), hup://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/lawyers-in-eu-draw-up-list-of-alleged-idf-
war-criminals- 1.5386.
118. See Kern, supra note 100.
119. See Rosenzweig & Shany, supra note 107.
120. For a discussion of the risks of such strategy and its legal implications, see id., at
"Conclusions."
121. Kern, supra notel00.
122. Rosenzweig & Shany, supra note 107, at "Conclusions."
123. The HCJ further determined that every case that involved civilian casualties had to be
examined by a special committee. See HCJ 769/2 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of
Israel (2) PD 459, 511 [2006] (Isr.).
124. The legality of the Shehadeh operation has been discussed in several cases before the HCJ, but
was challenged directly in HCJ 8794/03 Yoav Hess et al. v. Judge Advocate General et al. [2008] (lsr.).
Pursuant to the Court's recommendation, the Israel Prime Minister established the Special Examination
Committee, headed by Z. Inbar, the former Judge Advocate General and the Knesset Legal Advisor.
125. The Committee started its work in January 2008, and presented its final conclusions in
February 2011. The Committee's Chairman, Z. Inbar, passed away during the Committee's work, and
was replaced by former Supreme Court Judge T. Strasberg-Cohen. For the conclusions of the special
examination committee on the targeted killing of Shehadeh, see A Summary Report of the Special
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in Madrid, the HCJ rejected a petition calling for a criminal investigation of the
Shehadeh affair due to the fact that the examination committee was still
investigating the matter. 26 Obviously, the PCHR was trying to bypass the Israeli
legal system by inviting an unprecedented foreign scrutiny of, and possible
intervention in, its proceedings. Aside from establishing a dangerous precedent, a
court trial in Spain would have implied that Israeli authorities were "unable or
genuinely unwilling"'127 to handle the matter, while at the same time focusing
public attention on the examination committee and exerting considerable pressure
on its members.
As one could have expected, once Judge Andreu decided to take on the
investigation, matters unfolded rapidly, attracting a great deal of international
attention and causing political turbulence in and outside of Spain. The day after
Andreu's preliminary decision, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos,
being aware of the far-reaching implications of the decision against U.S. officials,
was quick to declare that the Spanish government would consider a proposal to
amend the law on universal jurisdiction. 128 Andreu, backed by other prominent
politicians who upheld Spanish judiciary's absolute independence, 129 was
determined, however, to continue the official investigation in the case. 130 Israeli
politicians protested in strong language against what they considered a
conspicuous intervention by the Spanish court in the ongoing legal proceedings in
Israel. 131 They were outraged further by the "ridicule and absurdity" of accusing a
"democracy legitimately protecting itself against terrorists and war criminals,"
instead of going after the terrorists themselves.' 32 In addition, they were incensed
by the possibility that Andreu could decide to issue international arrest warrants for
Committee to examine the action of prevention-focused Salah Shehadeh, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
(Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.pm.gov.il/PMO/Archive/Spokesman/2011/02/spokeshchade27021 I.htm.
126. See HCJ 8794/03, supra note 124.
127. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 16 at art. 17(l)(a) & (b)
(following the wording of the article). Recall in this regard that, although the "Goldstone Report" had
initially raised "serious doubts about the willingness of Israel to carry out genuine investigations as
required by international law" (see Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict, supra note 116, at 1961), in an April 2011 Washington Post Op-Ed, Goldstone admitted, "If
I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document."
Furthermore, Goldstone determined that Israel had fulfilled "to a significant degree" its responsibility to
investigate "transparently and in good faith the incidents referred to in our report," while the "Hamas
ha[d] done nothing." Richard Goldstone, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War
Crimes, WASHINGTON POST, (Apr. 1, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-04-
0 I/opinions/35207016 ldrone-image-goldstone-report-israeli-evidence.
128. Kern, supra note 100; Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Update-Universal Jurisdiction:
Spanish Court's Inquiry of the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY
NEWSLETTER, no. 5, May 2009 [hereinafter Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry]; Langer,
supra note I at 38.
129. Kern, supra note 100 (such as Deputy Prime Minister Maria-Teresa Fernandez de la Vega).
130. See Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry, supra note 128.
131. See Nicolaou Garcia, supra note 46 (quoting Ehud Barak, then Israel Defense Minister, "he
would do anything to annul the decision").
132. Kern, supra note 100 (quoting incoming Prime Minister Netanyahu).
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any of the Israeli senior officials and military officers, who could then be detained
upon arrival in any E.U. member state.1
33
In April 2009, the Spanish prosecution requested that the Madrid Court
dismiss the investigation, due to the ongoing, parallel investigation in Israel.
134
Judge Andreau refused, declaring that Israel was not conducting a criminal
investigation and that Spanish law provided for simultaneous jurisdiction to
investigate "war crimes."' 35 The prosecution immediately appealed the decision to
the Spanish Court of Appeals, which decided to revoke the investigation due to
lack of universal jurisdiction over the matter in June.' 36 Backing the position of
the prosecution, the Court determined that a substantial, minimal link or national
interest was required in order to implement universal jurisdiction that was
otherwise incompatible with the fundamental principle of non-intervention in other
states' affairs.' 37 The court further concluded that Israel had jurisdictional priority
in this case and that a genuine investigation that was subject to a judicial review
was already underway.' 
38
D. Dji Vu...
During this time, in March 2009, just before the Spanish prosecution
requested that Judge Andreu halt his investigation, a group of human rights
lawyers filed a lawsuit with Judge Garz6n of the Audiencia, against six senior U.S.
Bush-administration officials, including the former U.S. Attorney General, Alberto
Gonzales.' 39 The complaint charged the so-called "Bush Six" with giving legal
cover for the torture of terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay.' 40 The case, which was
one of several legal actions taken against U.S. administration officials overseas but
the first to go to court thus far, exerted tremendous pressure on the Spanish
political and legal systems. 141 In conjunction with the lawsuit against the Israeli
officials, it threatened to turn Spain's national court into a "global court,"'
142
serving as a plaything for competing political interests. 14' Finding itself in the very
133. See id.
134. Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry, supra note 128.
135. Id.
136. Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Update on Universal Jurisdiction: Spanish Court ofAppeals
Decides to Close the Inquiry into the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh, TERRORISM AND
DEMOCRACY NEWSLETTER, no. 8, July 2009 [hereinafter Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court Closes
Inquiry].
137. Id.
138. See id. (reviewing the minority opinion).
139. See Paul Haven, Spain: No Torture Probe of US Officials, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 17,
2009),
http://www.realclearworld.com/news/ap/intemationaU2009/Apr/17/spain no torture probe of us off
icials.html. Another judge of the Audiencia was already investigating whether secret CIA flights to or
from Guantanamo entered Spanish airspace or landed at Spanish airports.
140. Id.
141. Gordon, supra note 109.
142. Id.
143. See Haven, supra note 139 (using the words of Candido Conde-Pumpido, Spain's top law-
enforcement official).
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
awkward position of the Belgian authorities just a few years earlier and risking its
role as a player on the international stage, 144 the Spanish government proposed new
legislation in May 2009, intended to limit the law on universal jurisdiction.' 45
Despite all of the above, the PCHR had yet to give in, zealously deciding to
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Spanish Supreme Court. 46
Backed by INGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, that were witnessing the
beginning of the fall of Madrid as the capital of global justice, 147 in the beginning
of 2010, the PCHR published a report entitled The Principle and Practice of
Universal Jurisdiction.148  This report outlined the "inadequacies of the Israeli
judicial system" that "does not meet necessary international standards with respect
to the effective administration of justice.' ' 149  It concluded that "universal
jurisdiction constitutes an essential, long established component of international
law" and "it does [not] represent an attempt to interfere with the legitimate affairs
of the State; it is enacted as a last resort" and "is the only available legal
mechanism capable of ensuring Palestinian victims right to an effective judicial
remedy. In the broader context, universal jurisdiction is also an essential tool in
the fight against impunity. . . . [It] is a stepping stone on the road to universal
justice."' 0 However, the PCHR's argument did not convince the Spanish Supreme
Court, and in April 2010 the Spanish Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals to dismiss Judge Andreu's investigation. '5' A further appeal to
the Constitutional Court, although possible, was useless, particularly in view of the
Spanish parliament passing a bill in November 2009, presenting far-reaching
amendments to Spain's law that practically barred private litigants wishing to file
politically sensitive lawsuits.' 52
The Spanish saga was instrumental-evidently more than the Belgian one-in
demonstrating the high risks and costs involved in allowing individual magistrates
144. Gordon, supra note 109.
145. Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry, supra note 128; WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra
note 49 at 50.
146. Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court Closes Inquiry, supra note 136.
147. Gordon, supra note 109.
148. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, supra note 114.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. at 9- 10. See also Langer, supra note 1, at 4.
151. See Tribunal Supremo Sala de lo Penal, AUTO 550/2010 (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2010/04/13/auto-gaza.pdf; Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany,
Update on Universal Jurisdiction: Spanish Supreme Court Affirms Decision to Close Inquiry into
Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh in Gaza, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY NEWSLETTER no. 17, Apr.
2010 [hereinafter Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Supreme Court Affirms Decision] (the Court pointed
out, inter alia, that the fact the appellants had initially filed their complaint before the Israeli courts
inferred that they accepted the genuineness of the Israeli proceedings).
152. The reform to the Spanish law included three non-cumulative requirements for the application
of universal jurisdiction: presence of the accused on Spanish territory; Spanish nationality of the
victims; or other relevant connection to Spain. See Carlos Esp6sito, Shrinking Universal Jurisdiction,
ESIL NEWSLETTER, Feb. 2010, at 2, available at http://www.esil-
sedi.eu/sites/default/files/ESIL_SEDINEWSLETTER Feb 2010.pdf.
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to selectively decide on the application of universal jurisdiction proceedings, 153
particularly in complex contexts such as the global fight against terrorism and
ongoing political and military conflicts. 154 The combination of activist judges,
hungry for publicity, with the lack of legal safety valves proved to offer a very
futile soil for the breeding of manipulative lawsuits by politically motivated
interest groups and individuals. The powerlessness of the executive to review or to
prevent malicious forum-shopping by alleged victims further emphasized the
responsibility of states to exercise procedural rigor in enforcing their laws as well
as the need to create appropriate mechanisms to resolve competing jurisdictional
claims.' 55 The next state to learn these lessons the hard way-that is, through
manipulation of its legal system and ensuing diplomatic pressures-was the United
Kingdom.
VI. THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The law allowing universal jurisdiction proceedings to be initiated in the
United Kingdom was considerably narrower than the Belgian or the Spanish laws,
requiring the presence of the accused on British soil before proceedings could
effectively commence.' 56 In any case, under the system of "private prosecution,"
the law allowed any individual to initiate a criminal proceeding, even without
having any connection to the alleged offence, before a magistrate who could then
issue a summons or an arrest warrant to a visiting foreign official; all that was
required was mere prima facie evidence.'57 Practically, such arrangements could
hardly lead to actual court trials against Israeli officials within the United
Kingdom. 158 Nevertheless, pro-Palestinian groups realized the great potential of
manipulating the British legislation in an endeavor to disrupt the diplomatic
relations with Israel. Harassing Israeli officials and top generals thus became part
of the "well organized, well resourced and concerted attempt" that was "taking
place in Britain to demonize, criminalize, and delegitimize Israel in every area of
public life,"'159 and it was publicly supported by British politicians, 160 as well as by
judges.'6 '
153. Some commentators pointed out that the Audiencia judges had never sought to prosecute any
Hamas or Fatah terrorists, or crimes against humanity committed in Chechnya or Darfur, for example,
or any suspected Nazi war criminals who had sought refuge in Spain after WWII. See Kem, supra note
100.
154. See, e.g., Jouet, supra note 18, at 528, 531.
155. Id. at 513-14, 526, 531,535.
156. See Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1554-55; see generally Langer, supra note 1, at 15-
19.
157. Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1555.
158. WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49, at 50; Prosor, supra note 46, at 36.
159. Prosor, supra note 46, at 36, 46.
160. WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49, at 5-8.
161. Prosor, supra note 46, at 36.
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A. Challenging Customary International Law
In early 2004, an application for an arrest warrant against then Israeli Defense
Minister Shaul Mofaz was submitted to the Bow Street Magistrates' Court.162 The
application was based on a complaint initiated by the PCHR, on behalf of families
who had been affected by what was described as "'[t]he assassination policy of
Israel' or the 'Policy of Shooting with Impunity'," accusing Mofaz of committing
"grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 163 Mofaz was believed to be
visiting the United Kingdom at the time. 64 Clearly, the PCHR meant for the
complaint to challenge the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, which
did not explicitly mention an incumbent Minister of Defense among the high-
ranking officials enjoying absolute state immunity under customary international
law. 165 Eventually, the magistrate concluded that Mofaz, as a Defense Minister,
was also entitled to immunity, based on an analogy to the position of Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the logic of the ICJ's decision. 166 Nevertheless, despite the
fact that he was therefore barred from reviewing the application, the District Judge,
C.L. Pratt, did not hesitate to indicate that "the extensive evidence" supplied to him
"could certainly amount to 'grave breaches."' 167 This was a clear signal that
applications against former officials would be welcomed by the British judiciary,
which led pro-Palestinian groups to compile extensive evidence files against top
Israeli generals and former leaders.' 
68
B. International Legal Ambush
In August 2005, the PCHR 169 handed over evidence to the Metropolitan
Police relating to alleged "grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention
supposedly committed by Major General Doron Almog, former General of the
Southern Command of the IDF.' 7°  Following an application to the Bow
Magistrates' Court, an arrest warrant against Almog was issued in September by a
Senior District Judge in relation to "The demolition of 59 houses in Rafah, Gaza
strip, on 10 January 2002." 171 Due to leaked information, Almog, who was
scheduled to speak at a synagogue in Birmingham on the day after the arrest
warrant was issued, did not disembark from the plane, but instead flew straight
back to Israel, escaping the police awaiting him at Heathrow airport. 72 Israeli
162. Application for Arrest Warrant against General Shaul Mofaz, supra note 32.
163. Id. at 1 1-2.
164. Id. at 111.
165. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note 7, at 11 51.
166. Applicationfor Arrest Warrant against General Shaul Mofaz, supra note 32, at 11[ 10-15.
167. Id. at 113.
168. Nicolaou Garcia, supra note 46.
169. Id. (in collaboration with Daniel Machover and Kate Maynard from Hickman and Rose
Solicitors (UK)).
170. Id.; Recent Legislation, supra note 46 at 1555.
171. Nicolaou Garcia, supra note 46; Langer, supra note 1, at 17.
172. Nicolaou Garcia, supra note 46. Ali Abunimah, Israeli War Crimes Suspect Cancels London
Visit, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (July 2013), http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israeli-war-
crimes-suspect-cancels-london-visit (it was reported that Almog had decided to cancel another visit to
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generals, as well as top officials and politicians, were subsequently advised to
refrain from visiting the United Kingdom. 1
73
In December 2009, a British magistrate issued another arrest warrant against
former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni upon pro-Palestinian activist groups'
allegations that she had commissioned "war crimes" in Gaza. 7 4 Livni, then leader
of Israel's opposition, cancelled her planned visit to the United Kingdom.175 The
diplomatic rift between Israel and the United Kingdom was mounting, as Israel
retaliated by halting its routine, high-level "Strategic Dialogue" with the British
government 176 and by cancelling Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor's visit to
Britain. 177
C. Djhi Dejte Vu
Livini's near-arrest marked a turning-point in dealing with the abuse of
British proceedings,' 78 leading to intense political and academic debate,
domestically and abroad. Both Labour and Conservative leaders, having realized
the high costs of maintaining the system of "private prosecution" in universal
jurisdiction proceedings and fearing their further implementation by low-level
judges against U.S. and other foreign officials, vowed to change the law.' 79 U.K.
officials admitted that exploitation of the criminal procedure could "bring [the
U.K.] legal system into disrepute."' 80 The Legal Task Force of the Scholars for
the UK in June 2013, despite an assurance of immunity by British authorities, following an action by
PCHR lawyers challenging the decision of the U.K. government to grant Almog's visit the status of
"special mission" that in effect put Almog beyond the reach of the law). The PCHR challenged the
decision "given the fact that it was made by the UK government despite the existence of a warrant for
Almog's arrest on war crimes charges."
173. In September 2005, a complaint against Moshe Ya'alon and Dan Chalutz was filed in the U.K.
by the human rights group Yesh Gvul for their involvement in the Shehadeh targeted killing operation.
Ya'alon, who was invited to London in 2009, was advised to cancel his trip. Such was the case with
Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, and Minister of Public Security, Avi Dichter. Maj. Gen. Aviv
Kochavi, Military Intelligence Director, and Maj. Gen. Yohanan Locker, Military Secretary to the
Prime Minister, also canceled their visits to the U.K. See Chris McGreal, Israeli Ex-Military Chief
Cancels Trip to UK over Threat of War Crimes Arrest, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2005, 6:56 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/I 6/israelandthepalestinians.warcrimes.
174. See Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1555 n. 15.
175. /d. at n.16.
176. Id. at 1555-56.
177. Bennatan, supra note 41.
178. Reydams, supra note 9, at 26; Recent Legislation, supra note 46 at 1555.
179. See John Bellinger, Britain Amends Universal Jurisdiction Law, LAWFARE BLOG (Sep. 19,
2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/09/britain-amends-universal-jurisdiction-law/; Langer, supra
note I at 18-19. John Chapin, Universal Jurisdiction is Abused and Leads to International Friction, say
Legal Scholars, THE CUTTING EDGE NEWS, (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article = 12101 (in March 2010, the British government
declared that "the Crown Prosecution Service will take over responsibility for prosecuting war crimes
and other violations of international law, ending the current system in which magistrates are obliged to
consider a case for an arrest warrant presented by any individual.").
180. See Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1555 (quoting House of Commons Fourth Sitting, 20
Jan. 2011, Parl. Deb., H.C. (2011) 126 (UK)).
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Peace in the Middle East also released a statement condemning the misuse of
universal jurisdiction in the United Kingdom and elsewhere "in light of recent
harassment of Israeli officials" and insisted upon reform. 181
On the other hand, extensive lobbying by pro-Palestinian advocacy groups
and politicians, 8 2 backed by various INGOs and human rights groups, such as the
London-based Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International
Federation for Human Rights, 183 prolonged the political debates surrounding the
passage of amendments to the law.
Nevertheless, in September 2011, the U.K. Parliament accepted the Police
Reform and Social Responsibility Act, requiring approval by the U.K. Director of
Public Prosecutions-the head of the U.K.'s Crown Prosecution Service-before a
British court could issue a privately-sought arrest warrant for universal jurisdiction
offences. 184  This practically meant that the issuance of a warrant required
consultation with the Attorney General-the chief legal advisor to the Crown-as
well as the Cabinet Ministers, for their views on "such an arrest and the impact that
that might have on the U.K.'s national interest. ' ' 85 With this reform, the United
Kingdom joined Belgium and Spain, both which, within less than a decade,
drastically changed the scope of their laws on universal jurisdiction. Evidently,
even the United Kingdom-a country that had not enacted too permissive a law in
the first place-still could not resist the abuse of its legal system by politically
interested groups, as well as the selectivity of interested judges.
VII. THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF MANIPULATION: LESSONS AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS
A. Universal Jurisdiction-A Simple Concept?
"Universal jurisdiction is a simple concept;' 8 6 it "constitutes an essential,
long established component of international law"18 7  so goes the message
181. Chapin, supra note 179.
182. See Bennatan, supra note 41; see also Oliver Miles, How International Law Affects the
Palestine 'Peace Process', THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:59 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/201 0/nov/22/intemational-law-palestine-peace-process.
183. Universal Jurisdiction, LIBERAL DEMOCRAT FRIENDS OF PALESTINE (Feb. 16 2011),
http://ldfp.eu/universal-jurisdiction/. These organizations, as well as Liberty, Redress, Global Witness,
and Justice (the British section of the International Commission of Jurists) issued a joint brief on
Universal Jurisdiction in the U.K., expressing their grave concern that "any changes to existing law...
will undermine the capacity of victims of serious international crimes to hold accountable alleged
perpetrators ... by making all arrest decisions in such cases subject to political considerations rather
than being based on the legal merits." See also Richard Irvine, UK Rewrites War Crimes Law at
Israel's Request, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA, (Oct. 1, 2011), http://electronicintifada.net/content/uk-
rewrites-war-crimes-law-ismels-request/10446.
184. Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1554. (thus separating universal jurisdiction proceedings
from the arrest warrant procedures for domestic crime).
185. Id. at 1557. See also Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides Assembly's Legal
Committee; Further Guidance Sought from International Law Commission, supra note 20 (statement of
Douglas Wilson, U.K.).
186. Irvine, supra note 183.
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delivered by the PCHR, echoing some prominent INGOs. S8 Nothing is more
remote from the truth,'8 9 as a quick look into the discussions on universal
jurisdiction, which were held at the U.N. Sixth Committee (Legal) within the last
few years, demonstrates. Across the board, delegates note "the divergent views
and practices, the evolving nature of the principle, and new substance being given
to it," and the need for a "cautious approach [to] be taken" in dealing with the
complex issues involved.190 They warn that the "limitless application" of universal
jurisdiction might lead to "conflicts of jurisdiction between States, to subjecting
individuals to procedural abuses, or to politically motivated judicial
prosecutions."' t9' They call for an "unbiased application" of the principle in order
to "prevent its selective application or exploitation . . . for settling political
scores"'192 and note the need for "[f]urther clarification and consensus-building" to
"strengthen the application of universal jurisdiction" and "give legitimacy and
credibility to its usage. ' 193  Paradoxically, it has been the particularly extensive
activity of pro-Palestinian interest groups that has exposed just how complex and
unsettled the principle of universal jurisdiction is; this activity has been highly
instrumental in demonstrating to all and sundry within the international
community-legislators, politicians, judges and the general public-the dangers of
its unrestrained application, as well as the lack of consensus surrounding its
implementation.
187. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 9.
188. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FIDH POSITION PAPER TO THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS 64TH SESSION 10 (2009), available at
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH PositionPaper to the GA -_64.pdf (claiming that universal
jurisdiction is 'firmly enshrined in international treaty and customary law") (emphasis added); see also
Reydams, supra note 9, at 28; Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 19,
2009), http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universal-jurisdiction ("[T]he vast
majority of states recognize the validity of the concept of universal jurisdiction, as they are parties to
conventions that provide for it.") (emphasis added); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: STRENGTHENING THIS ESSENTIAL TOOL OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 8 (Oct. 2012)
(Amnesty International calls upon states to "uphold their commitment to universal jurisdiction, a long-
established rule of international law, and reaffirm the duty of every state to exercise its jurisdiction over
crimes under international law ... regardless where they have been committed and the nationality of
the suspects and victims.") (emphasis added).
189. See Reydams, supra note 9, at 10-24.
190. Meetings Coverage, General Assembly, Delegations Urge Clear Rules to Avoid Abuse of
Universal Jurisdiction Principle, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3441 (Oct. 17, 2012) (statement of Anniken Enersen,
Norway); see also Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides Assembly's Legal Committee;
Further Guidance Sought from International Law Commission, supra note 20 (statements by
representatives of Brazil, Tunisia, and the U.S.) (noting the "ambiguity surrounding the concept");
Legal Committee is Told 'Principle of Universal Jurisdiction' Needs to be Refined, to Avoid Possible
Abuses, Politicization, U.N. Doc. GA1JU3372 (Oct. 21, 2009) (statement of Hossein Sadat Meidani,
Iran).
191. Delegations Urge Clear Rules to Avoid Abuse of Universal Jurisdiction Principle, supra note
190 (statement of Femanda Millicay, Argentina).
192. Id. (statement of Grace Eyoma, Nigeria).
193. Id.
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B. The High Price of Manipulation
Within a very short period of time, the three leading states that had adopted
different modules of laws which allowed their courts to establish universal
jurisdiction proceedings had to amend their legislation. Due to political
manipulation, mostly against Israel, and later against the United States, all three
came to realize that such proceedings could be a double-edged sword. 94 They
consequently limited the scope of their laws in a way that either altogether barred
foreign individuals and groups from bringing lawsuits which bore no link to the
forum state or provided for substantial executive scrutiny of judicial decision-
making. Unfortunately, some of these far-reaching amendments might eventually
undermine the original notion of universal jurisdiction and thereby defy the
interests of international justice by preventing the application of the principle, even
in appropriate cases of exceptional character, where the prosecution of
international crimes and mass atrocities is truly warranted and justified. 195  In
particular, the requirement of a certain link to the forum state-that is, beyond the
mere presence of the accused-seems to be irrelevant to the original concept of
universal jurisdiction, thus undermining its fundamental idea of prosecution on the
basis of the universally acknowledged heinousness of the criminal conduct.
Manipulation of universal jurisdiction has thus created a backlash against
human rights organizations and activists, which provided broad, unqualified
support to pro-Palestinian groups' abuse of proceedings in their "lawfare"
campaigns against Israel.196 In the words of Reydams, such activity thus showed,
"[U]niversal jurisdiction was anything but universal in practice. As an almost
exclusively European affair [it] represented a curious mixture of mission
civilisatrice and resistance against United States Hegemony and Israeli
exceptionalism.' 197 Supporting-or downright manufacturing-headline-making
"virtual cases"' 98 against former senior officials, rather than strengthening
international criminal law, made a mockery of it.' 99 Instead of promoting a
transnational worldview and upholding global victimhood principles, it facilitated
the introduction of state-centric mechanisms and domestically-centered valuation
of international claims.2 00  West-European "universal jurisdiction campaigns"
should therefore serve as a resounding lesson for groups seeking either to promote
one-sided political agendas and gain publicity under the guise of promotion of
194. See, e.g., Bennatan, supra note 41.
195. See, e.g., Esp6sito, supra note 152.
196. See Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 188 (some leading INGOs still insist
that there is no abuse and manipulation of the doctrine in the case of Israel).
197. Reydams, supra note 9, at 27. Cf Langer, supra note 1, at 46 (suggesting that although
"politics necessarily plays a role in universal jurisdiction ... universal jurisdiction criminal proceedings
... have tended to be true adjudicatory processes").
198. Reydams, supra note 9, at 24. A term coined by Reydams to describe headline-making NGO-
driven cases against a host of (former) senior officials, which, with the exception of Pinochet,
"produced little more than headlines and diplomatic headaches (and fame for a Spanish judge)."
199. Id. at 28.
200. Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1557.
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human-rights and a global rule of law or to push too hard towards the "end of
nationhood" by undermining the sovereignty of certain states.
2 0 1
C. Unsettled Doctrine
In 2001, in their Joint Separate Opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, 20 2 ICI
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal presented a very supportive position
regarding the evolving right of national jurisdictions to exercise universal
jurisdiction in absentia. In their opinion-probably the most powerful formal
statement in favor of universal jurisdiction coming from prominent international
lawyers-the Judges in fact suggested that, according to contemporary customary
international law, a state may choose to assert jurisdiction over particular offences
committed elsewhere by persons having no relationship or connection with that
state.20 3
This observation, stated in the course of reviewing the legality of the Belgian
law before it was amended, was remarkable in view of the fact that-as the Judges
noted-there was no established practice at the time, in which states exercised
universal jurisdiction.20 4 The Judges thus admitted that "virtually all national
legislation envisaged links of some sort to the forum State" and that "no case law
exist[ed] in which pure universal jurisdiction had formed the basis of
jurisdiction."20 5 This, however, did not necessarily indicate, in the eyes of the
Judges, that such an exercise would be unlawful, since "a State is not required to
legislate up to the full scope of the jurisdiction allowed by international law." 206
Further relying on "contemporary trends, reflecting international relations as
they stand at the beginning of the new century, ' 2 °7 the Judges jointly determined
that:
[W]hile none of the national case law to which we have referred happens to be
based on the exercise of a universal jurisdiction properly so called, there is equally
nothing in this case law which evidences an opiniojuris on the illegality of such a
jurisdiction. In short, national legislation and case law-that is, State practice-is
neutral as to exercise of universal jurisdiction. 20
8
In view of the developments that followed, such an assertion would be
impossible to sustain today. It would amount to a proposition that customary law-
201. See, e.g., Kern, supra note 100; see also Mallat, supra note 44, at 189-90 (who framed his
petition in Belgium in the context of the fight for a so-called Kantian "cosmopolitan justice" in the face
of economic forces that "wreak havoc with peoples' lives.").
202. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note 7, at 63 (joint separate opinion of Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
203. Id. at 80, 59.
204. Id. at 76, 45.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 76, 47. According to the Judges, "contemporary trends" outline a "movement towards
bases of jurisdiction other than territoriality."
208. Id. 45.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
or in the words of the Judges, "the full scope of jurisdiction allowed by
international law"-develops in complete detachment from evolving state practice.
Furthermore, the fact that the main-and only-jurisdictions that allowed for the
exercise of universal jurisdiction "in its pure form," or close to that, later revised
their legislation to require a certain link to the forum state is a clear indication
regarding the evolving opiniojuris on the matter. It thus became clear that state
practice is no longer neutral regarding the possibility of exercising universal
jurisdiction in absentia, without even some connection to the forum state. This has
now become obvious not only as a matter of legal doctrine, but also as a matter of
political reality, in a way that indicates an evident change in "contemporary trends
reflecting international relations."
20 9
It is also important to note that even Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal required certain safeguards that were essential in their view to prevent
abuse of universal jurisdiction-based proceedings. These included the protection
of international immunities, as well as giving the national state of the prospective
accused the first opportunity to act upon the charges concerned.2" ° More
significantly, the Judges determined that "such charges may only be laid by a
prosecutor orjuge d'instruction who acts in full independence," without links to or
control by the government of the forum state. 2 1 Reality, however, proved that
reliance on the independence of the judiciary-although logical as a matter of legal
theory-was one of the main causes for manipulation and abuse of universal
jurisdiction. This led most national legislators to require the strict review and
approval by relevant government or prosecution officials as a pre-condition for the
exercise ofjurisdiction by national authorities.
Altogether, it is obvious today that, although the general concept of universal
jurisdiction is generally recognized under international customary law, its meaning
and application cannot be left to evolve customarily. Rather, it requires an explicit,
meticulous determination within a comprehensive international effort, most likely
in the form of a draft international treaty that would, first and foremost, settle in
detail the issue of jurisdictional priorities that have proved to be highly sensitive
and delicate. This would most likely impact other controversial matters that
remain largely unresolved, such as the authority to exercise jurisdiction-or even
to initiate a criminal investigation-in absentia, as well as the scope of sovereign
immunity that restricts national proceedings. Such an international instrument may
also provide some guidance regarding the level of national authority-whether
judicial, political, or both-that should be vested with the discretion to decide on
national proceedings.21 2  Evidently, despite what was advocated by certain
209. See text accompanying supra note 207.
210. Id. at 80, 11 59-60 (they also considered it necessary that universal criminal jurisdiction be
exercised only over those crimes regarded as the most heinous by the international community).
211. 1d. 159.
212. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 1, at 46-47 (considering the issue of the desirable level of
prosecutorial discretion and control by the executive branch over prosecutors to be critical; it is
particularly crucial in view of the fact that "selectivity is such a structural feature of universal
jurisdiction.").
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publicists, 2 13 decisions regarding these and related issues, that bear a tremendous
impact on inter-state relations, cannot be left to national legislators to make.
D. Asymmetric Application and Political Agendas
Most of the complaints brought against Israeli (and United States) senior
officials were intentionally framed in the context of, and as a means for
undermining, the fight against terrorism. They consequently exposed the
normative paradoxes involved in the asymmetric application of international
criminal arrangements. The fact that universal jurisdiction typically deals with so-
called "crimes of state" and the liability of state officials, 21 4 not with offences
committed by non-state actors and terrorists, still presents a significant challenge
that shadows the lofty goals underlying the doctrine. This is all the more true in a
world where the fight against the malignant phenomenon of global terrorism is not
shared evenly by states, and where there is still no broadly accepted definition-let
alone political consensus-regarding terrorist activity.215  It also raises deep
213. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 11, at 672 (regarding the requirement of the presence of the
accused in the forum state). Since in the case of universal jurisdiction, the national authority to initiate
proceedings derives from international law, all issues that bear a direct impact on the extent of such
authority-and therefore on the rights of the defendant-must be settled and determined under
international law, and cannot be left to the discretion of the national authorities (unless mitigating
factors are concerned). See, e.g., Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Ntirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal with Commentaries, Rep. of the Int'l L.
Comm'n, 2nd Sess., Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, 1950, Vol. 11, at 374-75, [ 99, 102, 104, 106.
214. Much like the ICC in this regard. Paradoxically, as Schabas notes, one of the strongest
arguments for excluding crimes such as terrorism from the jurisdiction of the ICC is that they "do not
suffer from a problem of impunity in a manner similar to that of other categories," such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression, being typically "state crimes," perpetrated by
governments themselves or with their complicity, and therefore went unpunished. SCHABAS, supra
note 15, at 98. Universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, was originally predicted on the ground that
certain crimes (such as piracy, slave-trade and traffic in children and women) were often committed by
non-state actors and in terra nullius, where no state could exercise territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 64.
215. See BRYNJAR LIA, GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM: PATTERNS AND
PREDICTIONS 9-15 (2005). Lia acknowledges that terrorism has long been a controversial term and that,
although "there has been a considerable resurgence in terrorism studies during the 1990s, and especially
after 9/11," as well as a growing consensus in academia on the definitional issue, "[s]till basic
conceptual and methodological questions remain unresolved" and no generally accepted definition of
terrorism exists. Id. at 10-11. He further acknowledges the "strong tendency to label anti-Western and
anti-Israeli violence, including attacks on military targets, as terrorism." Id. at 11. According to Lia,
the most widely used definition of terrorism is the one used by the U.S. Department of State in its
annual report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, where terrorism is defined as "premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Id. at 11 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM xii (2003)). He also notes that, "[g]iven the definitional and conceptual
problems of studying terrorism generically, one has argued that it is better to use a political definition of
terrorism, namely illegal violent activities practiced by groups listed as outlawed terrorist organizations
by the USA and more recently by the European Union." Id. at 14. Schabas notes that, proposals at the
Rome Conference to include terrorism as a category of international crimes under the jurisdiction of the
ICC did not meet with sufficient consensus. SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 96. He foresees that, since it
becomes increasingly evident that the ICC will only be able to deal with a very limited number of cases,
it is "entirely unrealistic to think that new criminal law paradigms, such as ... terrorism could be added
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concerns regarding the future application of universal jurisdiction in the context of
other controversial "state crimes," such as that of aggression.
216
Furthermore, in this regard, some commentators wanted to use universal
jurisdiction-based petitions against Israeli officials abroad as an incentive for the
conduct of "genuine and effective" domestic legal proceedings that would
allegedly defend officials from foreign claims. 217 There is surely no doubt that
prompt, objective, and effective domestic proceedings and investigations into
alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law are of crucial importance,
a national interest indeed. Nevertheless, if anything, the short but highly dense
history of proceedings against Israelis abroad suggests that domestic proceedings
are not an effective barrier against the abuse of foreign proceedings. 21 8  Once
lawsuits abroad are motivated, first and foremost, by political and propaganda
considerations, anything less than maximal prosecution will always leave room for
the argument that domestic proceedings are conducted "unwillingly" and
"ineffectively," or designed to get the defendant "off." In this way, as Kontorovich
observed, "while a prosecution" by the home state "cannot be undone by others,
decisions to not prosecute can be nullified by other states' decisions to prosecute,"
and extra-judicial settlements can easily be ignored.21 9 Consequently, a state
showing the slightest sign of being inclined to conduct domestic proceedings due
to fear of foreign lawsuits will most probably be inviting even more complaints
from abroad, risking foreign scrutiny of, and even possible intervention in the
conduct of domestic proceedings. 220 Such a development is particularly dangerous
in the context of the fight against terrorism, due to the "limited appreciation of the
unique dilemmas posed by terrorism and counter-terrorism.'
221
E. Controversial Involvement of INGOs and Interest Groups
The conduct of "universal jurisdiction campaigns" against Israelis abroad also
demonstrates the potential risks involved in the participation of certain INGOs and
interest groups in the conduct of future domestic proceedings and investigations.
to the jurisdiction." Id. at 97. Schabas further acknowledges that the problem with a distinct crime of
terrorism lies in definition, explaining that "[tierrorism seems to have more to do with motive than with
either the mental or physical elements of a crime, and this is something that is not generally part of the
definitions of offences." Id. Some argue that terrorist acts may fall within the scope of crimes against
humanity or even war crimes, but there is no consensus on this point. Id, at 15.; See also CASSESE,
supra note 11, at 162-64, 171-77.
216. See generally Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53
HARV. INT'L L.J. 357 (2012).
217. Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Supreme Court Affirms Decision, supra note 151.
218. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, I J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 580,
582-83 (2003).
219. Kontorovich, supra note 34, at 404 (on the problematic application of the principle of non bis
in idem ("double jeopardy") in the context of universal jurisdiction).
220. This is all the more so today, once there is no international agreement on the complex issue of
competing proceedings, and probably until a comprehensive multilateral treaty on universal jurisdiction
is concluded. See, e.g., Esposito, supra note 152; REYDAMS, supra note 18, at 16.
221. See Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry, supra note 107.
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Undoubtedly, these actors benefitted greatly from their intense involvement in
universal jurisdiction high-profile, politically controversial cases, gaining
publicity, funds and membership. 2  Today, when most of the relevant countries
have effectively closed their doors before foreign private litigants,223 the
motivation of interest groups to find and apply alternative channels of prosecution,
such as the ICC and home-state domestic legislation, is probably high. This means
that any consideration of new domestic investigation and prosecution proceedings
will certainly require serious evaluation of the proper procedural mechanisms and
legal safety valves required to ensure that such proceedings are not easily abused
and manipulated. Such an endeavor will probably require consideration of
complementary legislation regarding, inter alia, interest groups' sources of funding
and support for terrorism. At the same time, international judicial institutions,
such as the ICC, should be highly aware of not letting themselves be manipulated




Despite the enduring controversy regarding its content, limits, and modus
operandi, universal jurisdiction is an important concept and is here to stay. It
could-and should-evolve into a cornerstone of the multilateral endeavor to end
impunity and to bring justice to victims of the most atrocious of crimes. It is
therefore all the more unfortunate that "lawfare" in the form of universal
jurisdiction campaigns has set back the cause of international global justice in this
regard. Indeed, some commentators argue that universal jurisdiction had become a
mere "self-feeding hype generated by NGOs, activist lawyers and judges,
academic conferences and papers, and mass-media." 22 5  This may go too far.
Nevertheless, it is a powerful reaction in the face of the unbearable lightness of
political manipulation. If universal jurisdiction is to be meaningful in the future,
the lessons regarding the ease with which international law can be exploited and
222. See Byers, supra note 3, at 439-40.
223. Still, the amended Belgian law, for example, can be easily abused by litigants who are Belgian
nationals or residents, although this is not considered anymore a universal jurisdiction case due to the
link of the alleged victims to Belgium. Such was the case with the two Belgian activists who were
reported to file a war crimes complaint over the "flytilla" incident, against Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu, former Minister of Interior, Eli Yishai, former Minister of Defense, Ehud Barak, and former
Chief-of-Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, in January 2012. See Ali Abunimah, Two Belgians File War Crimes
Complaint against Israeli Leaders over 'Flytilla' Abuse, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (Jan. 18, 2012, 1:57
PM), http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/two-belgians-file-war-crimes-complaint-against-
israeli-leaders-over-flytilla-abuse/.
224. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Israel/Palestine-the ICC's Uncharted Territory, I1 J. OF
INT'L CRIM. JUST, 979 (2013); David Kaye, Who's Afraid of the International Criminal Court? Finding
the Prosecutor Who Can Set it Straight, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/Jun. 2011,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67768/david-kaye/whos-afraid-of-the-international-criminal-
court.
225. Reydams, supra note 9, at 27. See also Langer, supra note 1, at 5.
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diverted from its true objectives, turning it into an "international lynch-law, '227
must resound.
226. See, e.g, Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 24.
227. Jouet, supra note 18, at 537 (quoting the former British Prime Minister, the late Margaret
Thatcher); see also Kissinger, supra note 2.
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